Abstrakt
The subject of this work is the examination of selected ethical concepts from the perspective of their ambiguity, and sometimes even ambiguity. Terms such as responsibility, vice, forgiveness, authenticity, justice or recognition are part of our everyday language, but we often use them without distinguishing the levels of meaning contained in them. For example, the questions What is responsibility? or What is justice? cannot be answered with a single definition, not only because these are concepts relevant to both the field of law and ethics, but also because, even in the field of ethics, each of these concepts is reflected from multiple perspectives. An ethical subject is responsible for his or her actions, but also for others, while in the latter case, responsibility has a pre-contractual basis in obligations that are not the subject of negotiation, but which are given before its actual performance (e.g., the obligations of a parent to a child or the obligations of entities entrusted with protecting the safety and property of others). As for the concept of recognition, it is known that it has its basis in Hegel's philosophy, where it was perceived in connection with the constitution of subjectivity; however, we often overlook its other side: Recognition in its various forms is today considered one of the conditions for creating a socially just society. We associate forgiveness with the terms pardon, justification, grace, leniency and often ignore the fact that they cannot be identified; and even that in forgiveness itself two different, yet interconnected forms of ethical relationship with others function. The word vice usually evokes something negative, but we rarely admit that it can also have a positive connotation. The terms morality and ethics themselves are also marked by a characteristic semantic confusion, when we consider it quite natural to use them interchangeably. The authors point out through specific analyses that taking into account the polysemy of ethical concepts is a way to better understand our ethical experience, to become aware of the tension present in these concepts, implying on the one hand their internal content stratification, and thus their dynamism, and on the other hand the boundaries by which individual semantic aspects of one and the same concept are separated from each other.
Data
Publisher: Filozofický ústav SAV
Typ knihy: edited book
Vydanie: 1.
Rok vydania: 2009
Miesto vydania: Bratislava
Počet strán: 166
Language: slovenský
ISBN 978-80-969770-6-2 (print)
Ako citovať
ISO 690:
Smreková, D. - Palovičová, Z.: Dvojznačnosť etických pojmov. 1 vyd. Bratislava : Filozofický ústav SAV. 2009. pp. 166. ISBN 978-80-969770-6-2.
APA:
Smreková, D., Palovičová, Z.(2009). Dvojznačnosť etických pojmov. Bratislava : Filozofický ústav SAV. ISBN 978-80-969770-6-2.