DATE: December 15, 2025
VENUE: Library, Institute of Philosophy, Slovak Academy of Sciences, Klemensova 19, Bratislava (ground floor, turn right upon entering)
ZOOM LINK: Write to paolo.bonardi@savba.sk
PROGRAM
11:30 am (CET) – 12:45 pm Eric Wallace (University of Vienna)
Talk title: On the Loveliness and Likelihood of Coarse-Grained Propositions
Abstract: Many advocate for a theory choice methodology in philosophy, analogous to the theory choice methodology used in science. This methodology has been used by Timothy Williamson in a defence of coarse-grained propositions in semantics. Williamson argues that theories that employ coarse-grained propositions are to be preferred to hyperintensional theories that employ other kinds of propositions, such as Russellian propositions, sets of impossible worlds, and ordered pairs of sets of worlds and topics. This is because hyperintensional theories allegedly suffer from the vice of overfitting. I explain and clarify this defence of coarse-grained propositions. I then introduce a taxonomy of theoretical virtues that distinguishes lovely-making and likely-making virtues. A theory with likely-making virtues is, all things being equal, more probable. Lovely-making virtues contribute to the aesthetic character of the theory. Drawing on recent literature in the philosophy of science, I argue that many likely-making and lovely-making features result from idealisations. When properly deployed, lovely-making features have a role to play in good theory choice and modelling. I argue that the success of coarse-graining in semantics cannot be fully accounted for in terms of likely-making features. Rather, we should understand coarse-graining as an idealisation. Hence, Williamson succeeds only in providing a qualified defence of coarse-graining: while coarse-graining may be appropriate in many theoretical contexts, contributing to the tractability, confirmation, and fruitfulness of a theory, this does not show that it is true.
1:00 pm Lunch at bistro Otto!, Grösslingová 26, Bratislava (if you would like to join the lunch, please inform paolo.bonardi@savba.sk at least one day in advance)
2:00 pm – 3:15 pm Youichi Matsusaka (Tokyo Metropolitan University)
Talk title: Irrationality in Belief Ascriptions
Abstract: It is often claimed that one of the purposes of ascribing beliefs to others is to assess their rationality. This is one of the claims Kripke makes in presenting his puzzle: one should not ascribe to Pierre both the belief that London is pretty and the belief that London is not pretty, for his scenario assumes no logical deficiency on Pierre’s part. In this talk, I propose a new approach to analyzing the puzzle. I will argue that reflection on cases like Kripke’s reveals that we must be careful when “reading off” a person’s rationality from beliefs ascribed in natural language belief reports. In particular, I will make the following set of claims:
1. Pierre believes both that London is pretty and that London is not pretty.
2. The contents ascribed to Pierre in these attributions are not singular, but relevantly fine-grained propositions.
3. Pierre is not irrational.
3:30 pm – 4:45 pm Paolo Bonardi (Slovak Academy of Sciences)
Talk title: Millian Russellianism without Guises
Abstract: Guises play important roles in Nathan Salmon’s theory of belief reports, but their identity conditions are left open. In my talk, I defend cognitive relationism, a view that preserves Salmon’s Millian-Russellian semantics but dispenses with guises, introducing instead two purely cognitive devices: cognitive coordination, a three-place, non-semantic, non-transitive relation that includes the subject among its relata and is characterized through taking as and simulation; and token attitudes more fine-grained than ordinary modes of presentation, individuated using Russellian propositions and cognitive coordination. On this approach, full understanding has two components: a semantic one (grasping the content) and a cognitive one (detecting the speaker’s relevant coordination links in their token utterances).
5:00 pm – 6:00 pm Alice van’t Hoff (University of Vienna)
Talk title: Propositional Attitudes and their Converses
Abstract (provisional): This talk will discuss Nathan Salmon’s distinction among belief, failure to believe and withholding belief, when extended to propositional attitudes such as doubt and certainty.
6:30 pm Dinner at Bratislavsky Mestiansky Pivovar Dunajská, Dunajská 21, Bratislava (if you would like to join the dinner, please inform paolo.bonardi@savba.sk at least one day in advance)
ORGANIZER: Paolo Bonardi, Impulz fellow (project no. IM-2024-113), Slovak Academy of Sciences, paolo.bonardi@savba.sk
